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Sticky Leverage†
By João Gomes, Urban Jermann, and Lukas Schmid*
We develop a tractable general equilibrium model that captures the 
interplay between nominal  long-term corporate debt, inflation, and 
real aggregates. We show that unanticipated inflation changes the real 
burden of debt and, more significantly, leads to a debt overhang that 
distorts future investment and production decisions. For these effects 
to be both large and very persistent, it is essential that debt maturity 
exceeds one period. We also show that interest rate rules can help 
stabilize our economy. (JEL E12, E31, E44, E52, G01, G32, G35)
The onset of the financial crisis in 2008 triggered the most aggressive monetary 
policy response in developed countries in at least 30 years. At the same time, finan-
cial markets now occupy a much more prominent role in modern macroeconomic 
theory. Typical models of financial frictions focus on debt and identify leverage as 
both a source of—and an important mechanism of transmission of—economic fluc-
tuations.1 Surprisingly, the fact that debt contracts are almost always denominated 
in nominal terms is usually ignored in the literature.2, 3 Yet, nominal debt creates an 
obvious link between inflation and the real economy, a potentially important source 
of monetary nonneutrality even with fully flexible prices.
The goal of this paper is to develop a tractable general equilibrium model that cap-
tures the interplay between nominal debt, inflation, and real aggregates, and explore 
some of its main implications. In our model, as in reality, firms fund themselves by 
choosing the appropriate mix of nominal defaultable debt and equity securities to 
1 Some examples include Kiyotaki and Moore (1997); Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997); Bernanke, Gertler, and 
Gilchrist (1999); Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini (2004); Jermann and Quadrini (2012); Gourio (2013); and 
Gomes and Schmid (2016). 
2 Among the very rare exceptions are Dopke and Schneider (2006); Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010); 
 Fernandez-Villaverde (2010); Bhamra, Fisher, and Kuehn (2011); and De Fiore, Teles, and Tristani (2011). 
3 At the end of 2012, US  nonfinancial businesses alone had nearly $12.5 trillion in outstanding credit market 
debt—about 75 percent of GDP (Federal Reserve Board (FRB) 2013). Nearly all of these instruments are in the 
form of nominal liabilities, often issued at fixed rates of interest. 
* Gomes: Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104 (e-mail: 
gomesj@wharton.upenn.edu); Jermann: Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3620 Locust Walk, 
Philadelphia, PA 19104 and NBER (e-mail: jermann@wharton.upenn.edu); Schmid: Fuqua School of Business, 
Duke University, 100 Fuqua Drive, Durham, NC 27708, and CEPR (e-mail: ls111@duke.edu). We thank three anon-
ymous referees, Manuel Amador, Andrew Atkeson, Mark Gertler, Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde, Andre Kurmann, 
John Leahy, Michael Roberts, Victor RÍos-Rull, and Nikolai Roussanov for valuable comments, as well as partic-
ipants at presentations at the Atlanta Fed, Banque de France, Board of Governors, Boston Fed, CEPR Gerzensee, 
Chicago Fed, Cleveland Fed, Dallas Fed, Duke, ECB, Econometric Society, Georgetown, Minneapolis Fed, New 
York Fed, NYU, Paris School of Economics, Richmond Fed, Rice, St. Louis Fed, NBER Summer Institute, SED, 
UCLA, and Wharton School. All errors are our own. The authors declare that they have no relevant or material 
financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper
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issue in every period. Debt is priced fairly by bondholders, who take into account 
default and inflation risk, but is attractive to issue because of the  tax deductibility 
of interest payments. Macroeconomic quantities are obtained by aggregating across 
the optimal decisions of each firm and by ensuring consistency with the consump-
tion, savings, and labor choices of representative households.
We have two main results. First, because debt contracts are written in nominal 
terms, unanticipated changes in inflation, regardless of their source, always have 
real effects, even if prices and wages are fully flexible. In particular, lower than 
expected inflation increases the real value of debt, worsens firms’ balance sheets, 
and makes them more likely to default. If defaults and bankruptcies have resource 
costs, this immediately and adversely impacts output and consumption.
Second, and, more importantly, when debt is  long-lived, low inflation endoge-
nously creates a debt overhang that persists for many periods—even though debt is 
freely adjustable in our model. As a result, even surviving firms cut future invest-
ment and production plans, as the increased (real) debt lowers the expected rewards 
to their equity owners. It is this debt overhang phenomenon—emphasized in empir-
ical studies of financial crises but generally missing from standard models with only 
short-term debt—that accounts for most of the effects of changes in inflation on the 
economy.4
After establishing the intuition behind these results in a simple setting with flex-
ible prices, we develop these ideas in the context of a new Keynesian model with 
sticky prices and a monetary policy rule, linking  short-term nominal interest rates 
to inflation and output. We show that the model produces quantitatively plausible 
movements in the key macroeconomic quantities. Most notably, with flexible prices, 
hours are very smooth and investment and consumption tend to respond differently 
to nominal shocks. By contrast, the model with sticky prices significantly raises the 
volatility of hours worked and produces more realistic responses to nominal shocks.
The friction we emphasize is probably not suited to understand the response of 
the economy to all shocks. Nevertheless, we believe an environment with  long-term 
nominal debt contracts offers a perspective of financially driven recessions that is 
absent from standard models that either abstract from financial frictions or allow 
only for short-term debt. In particular, our setting offers a slightly different insight 
into the ongoing monetary stimulus around the world. Specifically, in our world 
standard Taylor rule parameterizations require central banks to try to raise the rate of 
inflation in response to a debt overhang episode, induced, for example, by a decline 
in wealth.
One important additional novelty of our paper is that we solve for firms’ 
 time-consistent optimal policies for  long-term debt when firms can adjust debt 
freely every period. We present a numerical approach that allows the analysis of 
model dynamics with perturbation techniques, and as such alleviates the curse of 
dimensionality of fully nonlinear global methods.5
While the notion that a debt deflation may have significant macroeconomic con-
sequences goes back at least to Fisher (1933), it has not been incorporated into 
4 Recent examples include Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and Mian and Sufi (2014). 
5 A similar time consistency issue arises in dynamic public policy problems, as studied, for instance, by Klein, 
Krusell, and  RÍos-Rull (2008). 
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the modern quantitative macroeconomic literature until quite recently. Our work 
contributes to this literature by introducing nominal  long-term debt in an aggregate 
business-cycle model and studying its role as a nominal transmission channel.
Other macroeconomic analyses with  long-term debt and default include Miao 
and Wang (2010) and Gomes and Schmid (2016). In both cases the debt is real. In 
Gomes and Schmid (2016), firms pick their debt at the time of birth and face costly 
adjustment thereafter. Their focus is on the role of asset prices to capture firm het-
erogeneity and forecast business cycles. The setting in Miao and Wang (2010) is 
closer to ours but in their model firms act myopically and fail to take into account 
that their current leverage choice influences future leverage, and through that, the 
current value of debt. As a result their approach is not really suitable to fully under-
stand the effects of debt overhang.
The asset pricing implications of allowing for nominal corporate debt in a model 
driven by productivity and inflation shocks is studied by Kang and Pflueger (2015). 
Their empirical analysis supports the view that inflation uncertainty raises corporate 
default rates and bond risk premiums. Their model assumes constant labor and con-
siders only  two-period debt.
 Fernandez-Villaverde (2010) considers nominal government debt, and 
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010) embed nominal entrepreneurial loans into 
a  medium-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. However, 
both use  short-term debt. De Fiore, Teles, and Tristani (2011) examine optimal 
monetary policy when firms have nominal debt with default risk. Eggertson and 
Krugman (2012) study leverage and debt overhang with short-term debt, but their 
focus is on real debt and investment plays no role in the analysis. Neither offers a 
quantitative analysis and both rely on  short-term debt. Occhino and Pescatori (2014, 
2015) examine debt overhang with  one-period debt. Jermann and Yue (2013) study 
interest rate swaps in conjunction with  short-term nominal debt and default.
Some studies on sovereign default have also considered  long-term debt in equi-
librium models, in particular, Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012); Aguiar and 
Amador (2013); and Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sosa Padilla (2015). In these stud-
ies, debt is real and the problem of a sovereign differs along several dimensions 
from the problem of a firm in our model. For instance, firms in our model have the 
ability to issue equity to reduce debt, while sovereigns do not have that choice.
The importance of debt overhang to corporate investment has been studied in the 
corporate finance literature, but usually in static (real) models which focus solely on 
optimal firm decisions and where debt overhang arises exogenously. An early exam-
ple is Myers (1977), and recent dynamic models are provided in Hennessy (2004); 
Moyen (2007); and Chen and Manso (2014).
More broadly, our paper also expands on the growing literature on the macro-
economic effects of financial frictions. This includes Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997); 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997); Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999); Cooley, 
Marimon, and Quadrini (2004); Gertler and Karadi (2011); and Jermann and 
Quadrini (2012).
The next section describes the basic model with flexible prices. Section II exam-
ines the key mechanism of regarding the real effects of inflation in a general context. 
Section III outlines our solution strategy and discusses our quantitative findings 
for the simple flexible price model. Section IV studies the properties of full model 
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with sticky prices and a monetary policy rule and is followed by a few concluding 
remarks in Section V.
I. Model with Flexible Prices
To isolate the key mechanisms associated with the introduction of  long-term 
nominal debt financing and investment, we first consider a parsimonious model that 
abstracts from other frictions. Firms own the productive technology and the capital 
stock in this economy. They are operated by equity holders but partially financed 
by defaultable debt claims. The firms’ optimal choices are distorted by taxes and 
default costs. Households consume the firms’ output and invest any savings in the 
securities issued by firms. The government plays a minimal role: it collects taxes on 
corporate income and rebates the revenues to the households in  lump-sum fashion. 
Later we expand this core setting to include other forms of nominal rigidities and a 
nominal interest rate rule for monetary policy.
A. Firms
We start by describing the behavior of firms and its investors in detail. At any 
point in time, production and investment take place in a continuum of measure 1 
of firms, indexed by  j . Some of these firms will default on their debt obligations, in 
which case they are restructured before resuming operations again. This means that 
firms remain  ongoing concerns at all times, so that their measure remains unchanged 
through time. Although this is not an essential assumption, it greatly enhances trac-
tability to use an environment where all firms make identical choices.6
Technology.—Each firm produces according to the function
(1)  y t j =  A t F ( k t j ,  n t j ) =  A t  (k) α  n 1−α , 
where  A t is aggregate productivity. Solving for the static labor choice we get the 
firms’ operating profit:
(2)  R t  k t j =  max  n t j   A t F ( k t j ,  n t j ) −  w t  n t j ,
where  R t = α  y t / k t is the implicit equilibrium rental rate on capital. Given constant 
returns to scale, all firms chose identical ratios  k j / n j , so  R t is identical across firms.
Firm-level profits are also subject to additive idiosyncratic shocks,  z t j  k t j , so that 
operating profits are equal to
(3)  ( R t −  z t j )  k t j . 
6 Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek (2014) and Gomes and Schmid (2016) present models where the  cross section 
of firms moves over time with entry and default events. 
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We assume that  z t j is i.i.d. across firms and time, has mean zero, and cumulative 
distribution  Φ(z) over the interval  [ z _,  _ z] , with  ∫  z _  _ z ϕ (z) dz =  ∫ dΦ (z) . We think of 
these as direct shocks to firms’ operating income and not necessarily output. They 
summarize the overall firm-specific component of their business risk. Although they 
average to zero in the cross section, they can potentially be very large for any indi-
vidual firm.
Firm-level capital accumulation is given by the identity
(4)  k t+1 j =  (1 − δ +  i t j )  k t j ≡ g( i t j )  k t j ,
where  i t j denotes the investment to capital ratio.
Financing.—Firms fund themselves by issuing both equity and defaultable nom-
inal debt. Let  B t j denote the stock of outstanding defaultable nominal debt at the 
beginning of period  t .
To capture the fact that outstanding debt is of finite maturity, we assume that in 
every period  t a fraction  λ of the principal is paid back, while the remaining  (1 − λ) 
remains outstanding. This means that the debt has an expected life of  1 / λ . In addi-
tion to principal amortization, the firm is also required to pay a periodic coupon  c 
per unit of outstanding debt.
For convenience, our model assumes only one type of debt which is of equal 
seniority. In practice, corporations are constantly issuing multiple forms of debt 
instruments which have somewhat different features. What matters for our purpose is 
that similar debt instruments are generally issued with identical levels of seniority.7
Letting  q t j denote the market price of one unit of debt in terms of consumption 
goods during period  t , it follows that the (real) market value of new debt issues 
during period  t is given by
(5)  q t j ( B t+1 j − (1 − λ)  B t j )/ P t =  q t j ( b t+1 j − (1 − λ)  b t j / μ t ) ,
where  b t j =  B t j / P t−1 ,  P t is the overall price level in period  t , and we define 
 μ t =  P t / P t−1 as the  economy-wide rate of inflation between period  t − 1 and  t . We 
will work with the real value of these outstanding liabilities throughout the remain-
der of the paper.
Dividends and Equity Value.—In the absence of new debt issues, (real) distribu-
tions to shareholders are equal to
  (1 − τ)  ( R t −  z t j )  k t j −  ((1 − τ) c + λ)   b t j  __ μ t −  i t j  k t j + τδ  k t j ,
7 For instance, IBM now has over 30 different bonds outstanding that were issued at different times, all with 
 pari passu clauses. More broadly, senior unsecured bonds currently account for 68 percent of corporate debt, with 
subordinated debt making up only 5 percent. Banks loans and revolving credit facilities account for most of the rest 
(S&P Ratings Direct 2014). 
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where  τ is the firm’s effective tax rate. The first term captures the firm’s operat-
ing profits, from which we deduct the required debt repayments and investment 
expenses and add the tax shields accrued through depreciation expenditures. This 
expression for equity distributions is consistent with the fact that interest payments 
are tax deductible.
It follows that the value of the firm to its shareholders, denoted  J( · ) , is the pres-
ent value of these distributions plus the value of any new debt issues. It is useful to 
write this value function in two parts, as follows:
(6)   J ( k t j ,  b t j ,  z t j ,  μ t ) 
   = max [0,  (1 − τ)  ( R t −  z t j )  k t j −  ( (1 − τ) c + λ)   b t j  __ μ t + V ( k t j ,  b t j ,  μ t ) ]  ,
where the continuation value  V( · ) obeys the following Bellman equation:
(7)  V ( k t j ,  b t j ,  μ t ) =  max  b t+1 j ,  k t+1 j  { q t j ( b t+1 j −  (1 − λ)  
 b t j  __ μ t ) − ( i t j − τδ)  k t j 
 +  E t  M t, t+1  ∫  z _ _ z J ( k t+1 j ,  b t+1 j ,  z t+1 j ,  μ t+1 ) dΦ ( z t+1 ) } , 
where the conditional expectation  E t is taken only over the distribution of aggregate 
shocks. This value function  V( · ) thus summarizes the effects of the decisions about 
future investment and financing on equity values.
Several observations about the value of equity (6) will be useful later. First, lim-
ited liability implies that equity value,  J( · ) , is bounded and will never fall below 
zero. This implies that equity holders will default on their credit obligations when-
ever their idiosyncratic profit shock  z t j is above a cutoff level  z t ∗ ≤  _ z, defined by 
the expression
(8)  (1 − τ)  ( R t −  z t j∗ )  k t j −  ( (1 − τ) c + λ)   b t j  __ μ t + V ( k t j ,  b t j ,  μ t ) = 0. 
It is this value  z t+1 j∗ that truncates the integral in the continuation value of (7).
Second, the stochastic discount factor  M t, t+1 is exogenous to the firm and must be 
determined in equilibrium, in a manner consistent with the behavior of households/
investors. Finally, the value function is homogeneous of degree 1 in capital  k t j and 
debt  b t j and so is the default cutoff  z t j∗ .
Default and Credit Risk.—The firm’s creditors buy corporate debt, at price  q t j , 
and collect coupon and principal payments,  (c + λ)   b t+1 j  ___ μ t+1 , until the firm defaults.
In default, shareholders walk away from the firm, while creditors take over and 
restructure the firm. Creditors become the sole owners and investors of the firm and 
are entitled to collect the current after tax operating income  (1 − τ)  ( R t+1 −  z t+1 j )  k t+1 j . 
After this restructuring, creditors resume their customary role by selling off the 
equity portion to new owners while continuing to hold the remaining debt. This 
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means that in addition to the current cash flows, the creditors have a claim that 
equals the total enterprise, or asset, value,  V ( k t+1 j ,  b t+1 j ) +  q t+1 j (1 − λ)  b t+1 j .8
Restructuring entails a separate loss, in the amount  ξ  k t+1 j , with  ξ ∈  [0, 1] .9
With these assumptions, the creditors’ valuation of their holdings of corporate 
debt at the end of period  t is10
(9)  b t+1 j  q t j =  E t  M t, t+1 {Φ( z t+1 j∗ ) [c + λ +  (1 − λ)  q t+1 j ]   b t+1 j  ____ μ t+1 
 +  ∫  z t+1 j∗   _ z [ (1 − τ)  ( R t+1 −  z t+1 j )  k t+1 j + V  ( k t+1 j ,  b t+1 j ,  μ t+1 ) 
 +  (1 − λ)   q t+1 j  b t+1 j  ______ μ t+1  − ξ  k t+1 j ] dΦ( z t+1 )} . 
The right-hand side of this expression can be divided into two parts. The first term 
reflects the cash flows received if no default takes place, while the integral contains 
the payments in default, net of the restructuring charges.
It is immediate to establish that this market value of corporate debt is decreasing 
in restructuring losses,  ξ , and the default probability, implied by the cutoff  z j∗ . It can 
also be shown that debt prices are declining in the expected rate of inflation—since 
equity values increase in  μ t+1 . Finally, note that  q t j is homogeneous of degree zero 
in  k t+1 j and  b t+1 j .
All together, our assumptions ensure that when the restructuring process is com-
plete, a defaulting firm is indistinguishable from a nondefaulting firm. All losses 
take place in the current period and are absorbed by the creditors. Since all idio-
syncratic shocks are i.i.d. and there are no adjustment costs, default has no further 
consequences. As a result, both defaulting and nondefaulting firms adopt the same 
optimal policies and look identical at the beginning of the next period.
B. Households
The general equilibrium is completed with the household sector. This is made of 
a single representative family which owns all securities and collects all income in 
the economy, including a rebate on corporate income tax revenues. Preferences are 
time separable over consumption  C and hours worked,  N :
(10)  U = E { ∑ t=0
∞
  β t [log  C t + θ log (3 −  N t ) ] }  ,
8 This is only one of several equivalent ways of describing the bankruptcy procedures that yields the same pay-
offs for shareholders and creditors upon default. Equivalently we could assume that they sell debt and continue to 
run the firm as the new equity holders. 
9 We can think of these costs as including legal fees, but also other efficiency losses and frictions associated with 
the bankruptcy and restructuring processes. These costs represent a collective loss for bond and equity holders, and 
may also imply a loss of resources for the economy as a whole. 
10 Note that creditors discount the future using the same discount factor as shareholders,  M t, t+1 . This is consis-
tent with our assumption that they belong to the same  risk-sharing household. 
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where  β ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of intertemporal preference. Assuming log preferences 
is not crucial but makes it easier to introduce sticky prices later. In addition, this pre-
cise specification allows us to normalize the steady-state number of hours worked 
to 1.
As is common in the literature, we find it useful to assume that each member of 
the family works or invests independently in equities and debt, and all household 
income is then shared when making consumption and savings decisions.
C. Equilibrium and Aggregation
Given the optimal decisions of firms and households implied by the problems 
above, we can now characterize the dynamic competitive equilibrium in this 
economy.
We focus on Markov perfect equilibria where the aggregate state vector is 
 s =  (B, K, μ, A) , where  B and  K denote the aggregate levels of debt and capital in 
the economy. The nature of the problem means that, outside default, this equilibrium 
is symmetric, in the sense that all firms make identical decisions at all times. The 
only meaningful cross-sectional difference concerns the realization of the shocks  z t j 
which induce default for a subgroup of firms with mass  1 − Φ( z ∗ ) . Default implies 
a one-time restructuring charge for firms, but these temporary losses have no further 
impact on the choices concerning future capital and debt. Thus, all firms remain 
 ex ante identical in all periods so that we can drop all subscripts  j for firm-specific 
variables so that in equilibrium  B t =  b t and  K t =  k t .
Aggregate output in the economy,  Y t , can be expressed as
(11)  Y t =  y t  − [1 − Φ ( z ∗ ) ]  ξ r ξ  k t . 
As discussed above,  ξ  k t captures the loss that creditors suffer in bankruptcy. Some 
of these losses may be in the form of legal fees and might be recouped by other 
members of the representative family. But some may represent a genuine destruction 
of resources. The relative balance between these two alternatives is governed by the 
parameter  ξ r ∈ [ 0, 1 ] . In the special case where  ξ r = 0 , default entails no loss of 
resources at the aggregate level.
The aggregate capital stock,  K t =  k t , obeys the law of motion
(12)  K t+1 =  (1 − δ)  K t +  I t ,
where aggregate investment is  I t =  i t  k t .
To complete the description of the economy we require that both goods and 
labor markets clear. This is accomplished by imposing the aggregate resource 
constraint,
(13)  Y t =  C t +  I t ,
and the labor market consistency condition,
(14)  N t =  n t . 
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II. Characterization
To highlight the economic mechanisms at the heart of the model, this section 
characterizes the firms’ leverage choice.
In this section we show that with long-term debt, real leverage responds per-
sistently to i.i.d. inflation shocks. That is, nominal leverage is effectively sticky. A 
debt overhang channel then transmits changes in real leverage to changes in real 
investment.
Under constant returns to scale, the firm’s problem is linearly homogeneous in 
capital and therefore its leverage ratio, defined as  ω = b/k , is the single endogenous 
state variable. As a result, it seems natural to use this measure of leverage ratio in the 
characterization of our findings.11
Conditionally on not defaulting, the value of a firm per unit of capital,  v(ω)  = V/k , 
can be written as
(15)  v (ω)  =   max  ω ′ , i {q ( ω ′ g (i) −  (1 − λ)  ω __μ) − i + τδ
 +  g(i)E M ′ ∫  z _ z ∗ ′ [ (1 − τ)  ( R ′ −  z ′ ) −  ( (1 − τ) c + λ)   ω ′  __ μ ′ + v ( ω ′ ) ] dΦ ( z ′ ) } 
where we use primes to denote future values, and the definition  g(i) =  (1 − δ + i) k . 
For ease of notation, we omit the dependence on the aggregate state variables for the 
functions  v (ω) ,  q ( ω ′ ) , as well as for prices  M and  R .
The market value of the outstanding debt (9) can be expressed as
(16)  ω ′ q( ω ′ ) = E M ′ {Φ( z ∗ ′ ) [c + λ]   ω ′  __ μ ′ +  (1 − λ)   q ′ (h( ω ′ )) ω ′ ________  μ ′  
+  (1 − Φ( z ∗ ′ ))  [ (1 − τ)  R ′ − ξ + v ( ω ′ ) ] −  (1 − τ)  ∫  z ∗ ′  _ z  z ′ dΦ(z)} . 
Explicitly writing next period’s debt price  q (h ( ω ′ ) ) as a function of the optimal pol-
icy,  ω ′ = h (ω) , on the right-hand side of equation (16), highlights the potential 
time inconsistency problem faced by the firm. With long-lived debt, the price of debt 
 q( ω ′ ) depends on future debt prices and thus on next period’s leverage choice  ω ″ . As 
no commitment technology is available, time consistency requires that next period’s 
leverage be a function of the current policy choice, so that  ω ″ = h ( ω ′ ) .
Finally, the optimal default cutoff level,  z ∗ , can be expressed as a function of the 
leverage ratio, as
(17)  z ∗ (ω)  = R − c  ω __μ −  λ _____  (1 − τ)   ω __μ +  1 _____  (1 − τ) v (ω) . 
11 This definition of leverage is also the most commonly used in the literature and is consistent with the empir-
ical constructs we use to calibrate the model. An alternative but less convenient definition is the so-called market 
leverage ratio,  b / V . Regardless of the measure used however, in our model, an inflation shock has no effect on the 
long-run leverage ratio, and a short-term transition is produced through a debt overhang effect. 
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Differentiating this expression with respect to outstanding leverage  ω we get:
(18)  ∂ z 
∗ (ω)  _______∂ ω = − (c +  λ ____ 1 − τ)  1 __μ +  1 _____  (1 − τ)  
∂ v (ω)  _____∂ ω < 0. 
Intuitively, an increase in outstanding debt increases the required principal and cou-
pon payments, and by reducing the cutoff  z ∗ (ω) , makes default more likely.12
A. Debt Overhang and the Impact of Inflation
In this subsection, we characterize firm behavior in response to an exogenous 
change in the inflation rate,  μ . To isolate how a shock to  μ is propagated in the 
model, it is assumed in this section that inflation follows an exogenous i.i.d. process. 
For the quantitative analysis later in the paper, the inflation rate is persistent and 
endogenously driven by real and monetary shocks.
The first-order necessary conditions with respect to investment and leverage are 
given by13
(20)  1 − q ( ω ′ )  ω ′ 
= E M ′ ∫  z _ z ∗ ( ω ′ )  [ (1 − τ)  ( R ′ −  z ′ ) −  ( (1 − τ) c + λ)   ω ′  __ μ ′ + v ( ω ′ ) ]  dΦ ( z ′ ) 
and
(21)  q ( ω ′ ) g (i) +  ∂ q ( ω ′ )  ______∂ ω ′  ( ω ′ g (i) −  (1 − λ)  ω __μ) = − (1 − τ) g (i) E M ′ Φ ( z ∗ ′)  
∂ z ∗ ( ω ′ )  _______∂ ω ′  . 
The first-order condition for investment, (20), equates the marginal reduction 
in equity cash flows today, on the left-hand side, to the expected increase in (after 
tax) dividend and capital gains tomorrow, after netting out any debt payments. This 
equation captures the debt overhang channel through which the default friction dis-
torts the equilibrium capital allocation.
The optimal condition for leverage, (21), recognizes that the debt price,  q( ω ′ ) , 
falls when new debt is issued,  
∂ q ( ω ′ )  _____∂ ω ′  < 0 , thus reducing the marginal benefits of 
more debt today. The marginal costs of new debt, on the right-hand side, reflects the 
impact of new debt on the probability of future default,  
∂ z ∗ ( ω ′ )  ______∂ ω ′  .
12 The envelope condition implies that
(19)  ∂ v (ω)  _____∂ ω = − q  1 − λ ____μ ≤ 0. 
When debt maturity exceeds one period (  λ < 1 ), an increase in outstanding debt decreases the (expected) 
future payments to equity holders, further encouraging default. 
13 We assume throughout this section that first-order conditions are also sufficient. It is straightforward to derive 
conditions on the distribution for the idiosyncratic shock  Φ (z) to guarantee that this is true when  λ = 1 . 
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The following proposition shows that the effect from unanticipated inflation 
depends crucially on the maturity of debt.
PROPOSITION 1: Consider an economy where optimal choices are described by 
the optimality conditions (20)–(21), and where: (i) there are no resource costs asso-
ciated with bankruptcy, i.e.,  ξ r = 0 ; and (ii) all realizations of exogenous shocks 
have been zero for a long time so that at time  t − 1 ,  μ t−1 =  _ μ,  ω t =  _ ω, and all the 
other variables are at their steady-state values. 
Suppose that at time  t the economy experiences a temporary decline in the infla-
tion rate so that  μ t <  μ t−1 . Then, if  λ = 1 ,  ω t+1 =  _ ωt and  i t =  i t−1 .
PROOF:
With  λ = 1 , the current inflation rate,  μ t , has no direct effect on the choice of ω ′ =  ω t+1 in (21). Moreover, since  μ t is i.i.d., there is no effect on the expected 
default cutoff (17) and the equilibrium price of debt,  q( ω ′ ) . In addition, since 
ξ r = 0 , there are no resource costs and neither aggregate consumption,  C , nor the 
stochastic discount factor,  M ′ , are affected. It follows that there are no indirect gen-
eral equilibrium effects either, and the optimal choice of leverage,  ω t+1 is unaffected 
by the shock. Finally,  μ t does not appear in (20) and therefore has no direct effect 
on the choice of  i .  ∎ 
Proposition 1 establishes that i.i.d. movements in inflation will not be propagated 
when debt maturity equals 1 period. As is clear from equation (20), current inflation 
has no direct impact on the  first-order condition for investment. Therefore, without 
indirect effects through  M ′ and  R ′ , incentives to invest will only change if leverage 
changes. That is, inflation shocks are transmitted to real investment, if at all, through 
a debt overhang channel.
When  λ < 1 , debt maturity exceeds one period and a decline in  μ directly affects 
the marginal benefit of issuing new debt. Specifically, the unanticipated decline in 
the rate of inflation  μ increases the (real) value of currently outstanding liabilities, 
(1 − λ)b / μ , and everything else equal, raises the marginal benefit from leverage, 
because  
∂ q ( ω ′ )  _____∂ ω ′  < 0 . Intuitively, as  (1 − λ)b/μ has increased, an unchanged level of 
leverage  ω ′ lowers the amount of debt that is issued,  ( ω ′ g (i) −  (1 − λ)  ω __μ) , and thus 
also reduces the impact on debt prices. As a result, equilibrium leverage  ω ′ will typ-
ically increase persistently while  i declines following even i.i.d. inflation shocks.14
Persistent responses of real leverage can also be understood as the reflection of the 
fact that the marginal debt price effect in equation (21),  ∂ q( ω ′ ) _____∂ ω ′  ( ω ′ g (i) −  (1 − λ)  ω __μ) , 
acts like an (endogenous) convex adjustment cost that slows down the response to 
shocks. Because this marginal price effect is an increasing function of the amount 
of debt issued,  ( ω ′ g (i) −  (1 − λ)  ω __μ) , it discourages the firm from making rapid 
changes to its leverage.15
14 Although we have no formal proof, it is always true that in our simulations unanticipated low inflation 
increases  ω ′ and reduces  i . 
15 Models with collateral constraints, such as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) or Jermann and Quadrini (2012), 
require a separate friction on equity or debt issuance to produce real effects from shocks to the collateral constraint. 
Here, with defaultable long-term debt, no additional friction is needed. 
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Figure 1 illustrates this analysis with an example of impulse responses to a one-
time decrease in the price level—equivalently an i.i.d. realization of unexpectedly 
low inflation. As shown in the third row, the permanent decline in the price level 
eventually produces an identical decline in nominal debt,  B , and leverage,  B/K , 
so that in the long run there are no real effects to this shock. Initially, however, the 
drop in nominal debt only partially offsets the inflation shock—nominal debt and 
leverage are effectively sticky. As a result, we can see in the second row that real 
leverage,  ω , and the default rate,  Φ ( z ∗ ) , both remain elevated for a prolonged period 
of time while investment also declines persistently.
Finally, note that by relaxing the extreme assumptions in Proposition 1, persistent 
movements in leverage will occur even when  λ = 1 . This will happen when either 
the underlying inflation movements are persistent or if there are some resource costs 
associated with default ( ξ r ≠ 0) .16
III. Quantitative Analysis
We now investigate the quantitative importance of the frictions induced by nom-
inal long-term debt. To better understand these results, we continue to abstract from 
the effects of any other nominal rigidities and consider only the model with flexible 
prices. A full quantitative characterization also requires two preliminary steps: a 
numerical solution strategy and a choice of parameter values. We discuss each of 
these issues in detail before reporting our main results.
A. Solution Strategy
The competitive equilibrium is characterized by (11)–(21), plus the  first-order 
conditions for consumption and labor supply implied by the household’s preferences 
(10). Later we also add a monetary policy rule guiding the dynamics of inflation.
The solution of the model is significantly complicated by the presence of the 
derivative  
∂ q ( ω ′ )  _____∂ ω ′  in (21). To understand the role of this derivative, let us differentiate 
the debt price function (16) to obtain
(22)  q ( ω ′ ) +   ω ′ ∂ q ( ω ′ )  ______∂ ω ′  
 = E M ′ {Φ ( z ∗ ( ω ′ ) ) (c + λ)  1 __  μ ′ +  (1 − Φ ( z ∗′ ) )  v ω ( ω ′ ) 
 +  (1 − λ)  q (h ( ω ′ ) )  ______ μ ′  +  (1 − λ)   ω ′  __ μ ′  ∂ q ___∂ ω ′  (h ( ω ′ ) ) ·  h ω ( ω ′ ) 
+  ∂ z ∗  ___∂ ω  ( ω ′ ) ϕ ( z ∗ ( ω ′ ) ) (− (1 − τ) ( R ′ −  z ∗ ( ω ′ ) ) +  (c + λ)   ω ′  __ μ ′ + ξ − v ( ω ′ ) ) } . 
16 In our quantitative analysis, the latter are typically not very strong. 
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Hence, the derivative of the debt price,  
∂ q ( ω ′ )  _____∂ ω ′  , is linked to the marginal impact 
of the current leverage choice,  ω ′ , on the future choice,  ω ″ , here captured by the 
derivative of the policy function  h ω ( ω ′ ) . The presence of this term complicates the 
solution by standard local approximation methods because  h ω (ω) is unknown and 
must be computed together with the policy function itself,  h (ω) . Essentially, there is 
one additional variable to solve for, namely  h ω (ω) , without an additional equation.
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Figure 1. A Decline in the Price Level
Note: This figure shows the effect of an unanticipated one-time decline in the price level on the key variables of 
the model.
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Our strategy is to differentiate both the derivative of the debt price function, 
equation (22), and the  first-order condition for leverage, (21). The two resulting 
equations now include  second-order derivatives for the debt price and the policy 
function,  
 ∂ 2 q ( ω ′ )  _____∂ ω ′ 2  and  h ωω (ω) . Again we need a boundary condition, but this will now 
be imposed on a higher order term. Specifically, we assume that the derivative of the 
policy function exhibits constant elasticity in  ω , but is otherwise unrestricted, so that
  ln  h ω =  A 1 (s) +  h 1 ln ω ,
where  A 1 (s) is allowed to be any arbitrary function of the state vector,  s . This implies 
a restriction that can be used as an additional equation to characterize local dynamics:
(23)  h ωω =   h ω  ___ω  h 1 , 
where  h 1 is a constant that can be determined from the deterministic steady state. 
This approach does not constrain the  first-order dynamics of  h ω , and yields a system 
of equations that can be fully characterized using  first-order perturbation methods.17
Solving for the deterministic steady state is also more involved than for standard 
models, because the presence of  h ω (ω) leaves the system of nonlinear equations 
that characterize the deterministic steady state short by one equation. To address 
this problem, we instead compute the deterministic steady state using value func-
tion iteration over a grid for  ω . Computing time is relatively short because the 
model is deterministic and there is a univariate grid. Also, this global solution only 
needs to produce the steady-state value for  ω , and not all the derivatives of the 
policy function. This is because the nonlinear system of equations for the deter-
ministic steady state is only short one equation. Effectively, knowing the steady-
state value for  ω provides us with the missing equation. Our Appendix provides 
additional details.
As an alternative, Miao and Wang (2010) solve a model with real  long-term debt 
by taking the extreme approach of setting  h ω ( ω ′ ) = 0 , thus ignoring any of these 
effects. Effectively, in their solution firms act myopically, not realizing that their 
current leverage choice influences future leverage and through that the current value 
of debt.
The presence of derivatives of unknown functions that characterizes the solution 
of our model is also a feature of  time-consistent solutions for problems of dynamic 
public policy, as studied, for instance, by Klein, Krusell, and  RÍos-Rull (2008). In 
their model, the government anticipates how future policy will depend on current 
policy via the state of the economy. Our solution method shares some of the features 
of the approach described in their paper.
Our solution approach allows us to overcome the particular challenges implied by 
 time-consistent firm behavior with  long-term debt without all the limitations of fully 
nonlinear global methods. Indeed, once the deterministic steady state for the firms’ 
17 Assuming instead that  h ωω equals its constant steady-state value produces slightly different local dynamics. 
3814 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 2016
problem is found, our approach can take advantage of the scalability of  perturbation 
methods to easily handle additional state variables, such as a nominal interest rate 
included in a monetary policy rule.
B. Parameter Choices
The model is calibrated at quarterly frequency. While most parameters are cho-
sen to match steady-state targets, some are pinned down by model simulations. 
With a few exceptions noted below, the empirical moments are computed over the 
1955:I–2012:IV period. All macroeconomic data comes from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis (FRED) website. Table 1 summarizes our baseline parameter 
choices.
Technology and Preferences.—Our choices for the capital share  α , depreciation 
rate  δ , and the subjective discount factor  β all correspond to fairly common values 
in the literature. Together they determine the  capital-output and  investment-output 
ratios, as well as the average rate of return on capital in our economy. As long as 
they remain in a plausible range, the quantitative properties of the model are not 
very sensitive to these parameter values.
Productivity Shocks.—We assume the following general AR(1) representation for 
the stationary component of aggregate productivity:
  ln  A t =  ρ a ln  A t−1 +  σ a  ε t a . 
We construct series for Solow residuals using data on GDP, hours, capital stock and 
the GDP deflator. This yields estimates of  ρ a = 0.97 and  σ a = 0.007 .
Table 1—Calibration
Parameter Description Value
Preferences and technology
 β Subjective discount factor 0.99
 γ Risk aversion 1.00
 θ Elasticity of labor 0.63
 α Capital share 0.36
 δ Depreciation rate 0.025
Leverage and default
 λ Debt amortization rate 0.05
 ξ r Fraction of resource cost 1.00
 ξ Default loss 0.29
 τ Tax wedge 0.40
 η 1 Distribution parameter 0.6815
Shocks
 ρ a Persistence technology shock 0.97
 σ a Volatility technology shock 0.007
 ρ μ Persistence inflation 0.85
 σ ϵ, μ Volatility inflation shocks 0.004
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To summarize the behavior of idiosyncratic profit shocks, we adopt a general 
quadratic approximation to its probability density function (PDF):
(24)  ϕ(z) =  η 1 +  η 2 z +  η 3  z 2 . 
Our earlier assumptions about the distribution’s mean imply that  η 2 = 0 . Imposing 
symmetry on  ϕ(z) with  _ z = − z _ = 1 ensures that there is only one free parameter,  η 1 . 
Its value is selected to target the unconditional volatility of the leverage ratio, a key 
variable in our model. While  η 1 is closely linked to the volatility of leverage, for the 
range of values for  η 1 for which the model can be solved, the model cannot produce 
enough volatility in leverage to fully match the empirical calibration target.
Together with the average leverage ratio,  ω , and expected debt life,  1/λ , the value 
for  η 1 is a crucial determinant of the impact and persistence of shocks on firm lever-
age and investment. This is because the choice of  η 1 governs the mass of firms 
accumulated around the default threshold of  ϕ( z ∗ ) . If this mass is sizable, shocks 
can have large impacts on the default probability,  Φ( z ∗ ) , and on bond prices,  q(ω) .
Leverage Parameters.—The parameter  λ determines average debt maturity. This 
is an important parameter for determining the propagation of shocks. We choose a 
value of  λ = 0.05 per quarter, implying an average expected maturity of five years, 
similar to initial maturities of industrial and commercial loans, and significantly 
shorter than those for corporate bonds. Given the importance of this parameter, we 
prefer to focus on the results when debt maturity is conservatively calibrated. We 
also document how results change when average debt maturities change. The peri-
odic coupon rate,  c is much less important. We set it to  c = exp (μ) /β − 1 , so that 
the price of default free debt is equal to 1.
Given  c and  λ , the expressions for bond prices (16) and optimal investment (20) 
link the default loss parameter,  ξ , and the tax wedge,  τ , with the  steady-state levels 
of the default rate  Φ( z ∗ ) and the leverage ratio,  ω . Default rates are chosen to closely 
match Moody’s average default rate of 0.26 percent per quarter (Moody’s Investor 
Service 2014). The leverage ratio is constructed using data from the FRB (2013) 
and defined as the ratio of credit market instruments to real assets (at current cost) 
plus cash and cash equivalent holdings for the US  nonfinancial business sector. This 
equals  42 percent for both entire sample and the subperiod since 1971. Recent val-
ues however are much higher, with corporate debt ratios averaging almost 52 per-
cent between 2005 and 2009.
With this data we estimate values of  ξ = 0.29 and  τ = 0.4 . The chosen default 
cost parameters imply average  steady-state recovery rates at default of about 30 per-
cent. Higher default costs imply that firms are less likely to default in equilibrium so 
that overall expected default costs remain unchanged. Finally we assume all restruc-
turing charges involve a deadweight resource loss so that  ξ r = 1 .18
18 The (statutory) wedge implied by corporate income rates and the tax treatment of individual interest and 
equity income during this period is about  25 percent. As a result, we should think of  τ as capturing other relative 
benefits of using debt rather than equity (e.g., issuance costs). 
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Inflation Dynamics.—In the basic model with flexible prices the dynamics of 
inflation are exogenous and determined by the monetary authority. Hence, in this 
section we will directly model the dynamics of inflation by assuming it follows an 
AR(1) process that matches both the quarterly volatility and persistence of this vari-
able. For the period between 1955:I–2012:IV these are estimated to be  0.004 and 
0.85 , respectively.
Summary.—Table 1 summarizes our parameter choices for the benchmark cali-
bration. The model is quite parsimonious and requires only 10 structural parameters, 
in addition to the stochastic process for the shocks. Table 2 shows the implications 
of these choices for the first and second (unconditional) moments of a number of 
key variables.
The second panel in Table 2 shows that our quantitative model shares many of the 
properties of other variations of the stochastic growth model. All the main aggre-
gates have plausible volatilities, except for labor, as is typical in the standard sto-
chastic growth model. The empirical standard deviation for default rates is available 
only at an annual frequency, and is equal to 1.4 percent (Moody’s Investor Service 
2014). The model counterpart is quite close at 1.6 percent.
C. Findings
We now investigate the quantitative importance of the frictions induced by nom-
inal  long-term debt. We are interested in determining how the model responds to 
movements in the inflation rate and how much endogenous propagation can plau-
sibly be generated by the combination of our sticky leverage and debt overhang 
mechanisms.
Response to Inflation Changes.—Proposition 1 shows that under very general 
conditions, even pure i.i.d. movements in inflation can induce prolonged movements 
Table 2—Aggregate Moments
Model Data Standard error
First moments
Investment/output,  I / Y 0.24 0.20 0.0071
Leverage 0.42 0.42 0.0081
Default rate,  1 − Φ( z ∗ ) 0.0022 0.0026  0. 0015 a 
Second moments
 σ Y 1.44 1.65 0.0013
 σ I / σ Y 3.46 4.23 0.1824
 σ C / σ Y 0.37 0.52 0.0277
 σ N / σ Y 0.38 1.07 0.1422
 σ ω 0.67 1.7 0.0015
 σ μ 0.5 0.5 0.0005
Notes: The reported first moments are computed as averages in the data, and steady-state values 
in the model. Second moments are standard deviations based on HP1600-filtered data and model 
series. Standard errors are Newey-West corrected.
a Standard error of the annual default rate
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in corporate leverage and investment. Figure 2 shows how more realistic changes in 
the inflation rate are reflected in the general equilibrium response of the key macro-
economic aggregates.
Following a one-standard-deviation negative shock to inflation, the default rate 
increases as the real value of outstanding corporate liabilities increases. This increase 
in the default rate immediately produces output losses since restructuring costs are 
not rebated to households and represent real deadweight losses. For a  0.4 percent 
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Figure 2. An Inflation Shock
Note: This figure shows the effect of an unanticipated one-standard-deviation decline in the inflation rate,  μ t , on the 
key variables of the model.
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innovation in inflation, investment and output decline at impact by  2.5 percent and 
0.5 percent, respectively.
Inflation shocks have particularly strong and persistent effects on investment. 
Strong impact effects on investment are not particularly surprising since other mod-
els of financial frictions often produce large distortions in the investment Euler 
equation (for instance, Jermann and Quadrini 2012). Because our household/ 
investors have log preferences, risk premia are very small and the source of the 
financial friction is tied to the expected loss upon default—which depends on the 
default loss parameter,  ξ .
The more striking result, a priori, is the large persistence in the investment 
response, which mirrors that in default rates and leverage, and is driven by the sticky 
leverage and debt overhang effects discussed above. As Proposition 1 implies, lever-
age—here we report its market value,  q ω ′ —rises and remains elevated for a long 
time even though inflation quickly returns to its long-run mean, leading to a pro-
longed, and significant, contraction in investment spending.
Figure 2 captures one weakness in this flexible price model. Initially, at least, 
changes in inflation mainly induce intratemporal reallocation between consumption 
and investment expenditures. While the increase in the required rental rate on capital 
works to stifle investment, it leads to a short-term boom in consumption. Eventually, 
the lower capital stock leads to lower output, and consumption begins to decline. 
Labor initially mirrors the behavior of consumption, as households seek to smooth 
their leisure decisions as well, but, over time, reduced capital contributes to lowering 
the marginal product of labor. To address this issue we will consider a version of the 
model with sticky prices in the next section.19
Finally, it is worth restating that, with flexible prices, the exact source of inflation 
is irrelevant. The responses of the key variables will be similar regardless of whether 
the inflation movements are exogenous or induced by some monetary policy rule. 
All that matters for these dynamics is the actual behavior of the inflation rate.
Variance Decomposition.—Table 3 shows the contribution of inflation shocks to 
the total variance of key macro and financial aggregates in the flexible price model 
as well as the sensitivity of this measure with respect to some key assumptions.20
Regardless of our calibration, inflation shocks are always the dominant source of 
variations in leverage and default rates. In addition, in our benchmark model infla-
tion is also responsible for 44 percent of the variance of investment and 23 percent 
of the variance of output. Clearly, even in this flexible price model, inflation nonneu-
tralities can be quantitatively important.
In the baseline case, leverage matches the data for the period since 1955. When 
our economy is calibrated to an average leverage ratio of only 32 percent, inflation 
still accounts for about one-quarter of the movements in investment. If, instead, the 
leverage ratio matches the value observed in the period between  2005–2009, which 
19 Another possible alternative is to instead use GHH preferences (Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman 1988). 
In this case consumption and labor do not move on impact and will decline afterward. 
20 Since movements in total factor productivity (TFP) are the only other source of fluctuations here, the fraction 
of the variance coming from TFP shocks is 1 minus the number reported in the table. 
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is 52 percent, inflation shocks account for two-thirds of the investment variance and 
nearly one-half of the variance of output.
Table 3 also shows that with  one-period debt, real quantities are almost unaffected 
by movements in the inflation rate, and we essentially recover monetarily neutrality. 
There are two reasons for this. First, for a given inflation process, percentage gains 
and losses on bonds produced by inflation are quite small with short maturities. 
Second, the debt overhang channel is entirely absent with  one-period debt.
IV. Model with Nominal Rigidities
The flexible price model is very useful to illustrate the key role of stickiness of 
nominal liabilities and the persistent effect of inflation movements on economic 
aggregates induced by the overhang of  long-term debt. However, the model fails to 
match the volatility of aggregate hours. More significantly, as shown in Figure 2, 
the model suffers from a basic  comovement problem in that debt overhang leads at 
impact to an intratemporal reallocation of resources toward consumption.
In addition, the flexible price model isolates the determination of inflation, thus 
failing to allow for the joint endogeneity of aggregate prices and quantities. To 
address these concerns we now consider an expanded version of the model that 
allows for nominal price rigidities. Adding this standard form of money  nonneutrality 
both improves the model’s ability to fit the data and allows us to better appreciate 
the relative importance of  long-term nominal debt to macroeconomic fluctuations.
To accomplish this, we modify the model by introducing a new economic agent: 
 monopolistically competitive retailers. While our firms remain perfectly competi-
tive they now produce (intermediate) goods that are sold to retailers, before being 
finally passed to the final consumers. We now also explicitly model the behavior of 
the monetary authority.
A. Retailers
There is a continuum of retailers, indexed by  r ∈ [ 0, 1 ] . Retailers buy goods 
from the intermediate producers at real (or deflated) price/cost  P mt , package them, 
and sell them to households at nominal price  P rt . Each retailer acts as a monopolist. 
The final good, used for consumption and investment, is a constant elasticity of sub-
stitution (CES) aggregator of the retailers’ output, denoted  Y rt :
(25)  Y t =  [ ∫ 0 1  ( Y rt ) (ϵ−1)/ϵ ] ϵ/(ϵ−1) ,
Table 3—Variance Decomposition (Due to Inflation)
Output Investment Consumption Hours Leverage Default
Benchmark 0.23 0.44 0.16 0.12 0.88 0.99
Shorter maturity,  λ = 0.06 0.22 0.42 0.14 0.10 0.86 0.99
One-period debt,  λ = 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.99
High leverage ( 0.52 ) 0.43 0.70 0.58 0.46 0.93 0.98
Low leverage ( 0.32 ) 0.10 0.22 0.04 0.03 0.64 0.99
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where  ϵ is linked to the elasticity of substitution across the different varieties of 
goods sold by retailers. It follows that each retailer faces the demand curve:
(26)  Y rt =  Y t  [  P rt  ___ P t  ] 
−ϵ
 . 
Following Calvo (1983) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), we 
assume each retailer can change their price optimally in period  t with probability 
1 − ψ . A retailer then chooses  P t ⋆ optimally to solve
(27)  max  P t ⋆   E t   ∑ i=0
∞
   ψ i  M t, t+i [  P t 
⋆  ___  P t+i −  P m, t+i ]  Y r, t+i . 
Note that this implies that the optimal price,  P t ⋆ , will be identical across the retailers 
setting prices at time  t .
The optimal price-setting behavior implies the following law of motion for the 
aggregate price level (Calvo 1983):
(28)  P t =  [ ∫ 0 1  P ft 1−ϵ ] 1/(1−ϵ) =  [(1 − ψ)  ( P t ⋆ ) 1−ϵ + ψ  [ P t−1 ] 1−ϵ ] 1/(1−ϵ) .
This formulation requires us to specify only two new parameter values, the elas-
ticity of substitution,  ϵ , and the probability of price fixing,  ψ .
B. Monetary Authority
In accordance with the literature we assume the monetary authority uses the 
Taylor rule,
(29)  ln  r t =  v 0 +  ρ r ln  r t−1 + (1 −  ρ r ) [ v μ ln  μ t +  v y ln ( Y t / Y t−1 ) ] +  ζ t ,  
where  r t is the nominal (gross) one-period interest rate, which obeys the Euler equation,
(30)  r t =  1 ___________  E t  M t, t+1 / μ t+1 ,  
and  ζ t is an exogenous monetary policy shock.
C. Quantitative Analysis
To study the properties of this sticky price model, we need to specify the val-
ues for a number of additional parameters. Regarding the monetary policy rule, the 
responses to inflation and output growth are set to  v y = 0.2 and  v μ = 1.5 while the 
smoothing parameter is estimated to be  ρ r = 0.5 . These values are consistent with 
estimates from the literature.21 The volatility and persistence of the monetary policy 
21 See Clarida, GalÍ, and Gertler (2000). 
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shock,  ζ t , are set so that the model matches the quarterly volatility and persistence 
of the inflation rate.
The elasticity of substitution between goods sold by retailers,  ϵ , is set to  5 , 
close to the value in Gertler and Karadi (2011), and the estimates in Primiceri, 
Schaumburg, and Tambalotti (2006). Regarding price stickiness, we follow 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and assume  ψ = 0.6 so that retailers 
 reoptimize prizes once every 2.5 quarters, on average.22
Table 4 compares the predictions of the flexible and sticky price versions of the 
model to the unconditional moments of key macro variables. Notably, the version of 
the model with sticky prices produces much higher volatility in work hours, match-
ing their volatility relative to output over the business cycle.23
Figures 3 and 4 document the response of the key variables in the model to mon-
etary and total factor productivity shocks. In both figures the dotted lines show the 
baseline responses in the model with  long-term debt, while the dashed lines depict 
the case where debt maturity is just one period.
It is apparent that the responses are always larger in the model with  long-term 
debt. The differences are particularly significant for monetary policy shocks. 
Figure 3 shows that even though inflation dynamics are very similar, the model with 
 long-term debt produces a much larger drop in investment, hours worked, and output. 
As before, these general equilibrium responses are largely due to the  long-lasting 
movements in corporate leverage and the effects of debt overhang on investment.
The figure also shows that the sticky price model does not suffer from a 
 comovement problem: now both consumption and investment drop following a mon-
etary tightening. This is because sticky prices lead to a much larger immediate drop 
in output in response to this shock.
It is well known that the effects of technology shocks can be amplified by adding 
financing frictions to corporate investment. Figure 4 shows that these effects can be 
22 Our choice is also close to the micro evidence from Bils and Klenow (2004). 
23 We also recalibrate the distribution parameter for the idiosyncratic shocks,  η 1 , to 0.695. This preserves the 
volatility of leverage across model versions. 
Table 4—Aggregate Moments
Flexible prices Sticky prices Data Standard error
First moments
Investment/output,  I / Y 0.24 0.20 0.20 0.0071
Leverage,  ω 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.0081
Default rate,  1 − Φ( z ∗ ) 0.0022 0.0026 0.0026  0. 0015 a 
Second moments
 σ Y 1.44 1.45 1.65 0.0013
 σ I / σ Y 3.46 4.98 4.23 0.1824
 σ C / σ Y 0.37 0.41 0.52 0.0277
 σ N / σ Y 0.38 1.05 1.07 0.1244
 σ ω 0.67 0.69 1.7 0.0015
 σ μ 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0005
Notes: The reported first moments are computed as averages in the data, and steady-state values in the model. 
Second moments are standard deviations based on HP1600-filtered data and model series. Standard errors are 
Newey-West corrected.
a Standard error of the annual default rate.
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further amplified (and propagated) when these frictions take the form of  long-term 
nominal debt. While the differences between the  long-term and  short-term debt 
cases are smaller than for the monetary shocks, the responses of the main macro 
quantities exhibit more persistence when debt maturity is longer.
Notably, with  long-term debt, the model can generate a realistic drop in hours 
worked. This is not the case when debt matures after one period. To obtain an initial 
drop in hours worked in this case we would need to allow for a larger (and less plau-
sible) degree of price rigidity,  ψ .
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Figure 3. A Monetary Shock
Note: This figure shows the effect of an exogenous shock to the monetary policy rule on the key variables of the 
model, with  long-term debt,  λ = 0.05 (dotted line) and  short-term debt,  λ = 1 (dashed line).
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Variance Decomposition.—Table 5  reexamines the contribution of monetary 
shocks to the total variance of key macro and financial aggregates with sticky prices. 
The model with sticky prices exhibits even stronger monetary nonneutralities. Now 
even when debt lasts for only one period ( λ = 1 ), nominal shocks account for about 
34 percent of the total variance of GDP and nearly 47 percent of that in investment.
Interestingly, the table also shows that the effects of the nominal frictions are 
almost additive. The contribution of nominal shocks to the variance of GDP in the 
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Note: This figure shows the effect of a negative productivity shock on the key variables of the model, with  long-term 
debt,  λ = 0.05 (dotted line) and  short-term debt,  λ = 1 (dashed line).
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sticky price model with  long-term debt ( 38 percent) is essentially equal to the sum 
of the contributions of sticky prices ( 24 percent, for  λ = 1 ) plus that of sticky 
 long-term debt ( 23 percent, in the flexible price model).
For investment and consumption, the two nominal frictions have typically also 
about the same impact. Sticky prices are more important for the variation of hours, 
but corporate leverage and default are driven almost exclusively by debt.
A Collapse in Wealth.—As a final experiment, we examine the case of a large 
decline in the value of the stock of capital in the economy. This experiment can be 
viewed as capturing some aspects of the contraction seen since 2007–2008, with 
sharply declining real estate values. Formally, this is implemented by an unexpected 
decrease in the value of the capital stock  k of 5 percent, through a  one-time increase 
in the depreciation rate,  δ . Our implementation is similar to that in Gertler and 
Karadi (2011) and Gourio (2013). Unlike these authors, however, our model does 
not require a persistent shock to generate a prolonged decline in investment after the 
initial period.
Figure 5 examines the effects of this shock in the neoclassical (flexible price) 
model with  long-term debt, where inflation does not move at all, and in the full New 
Keynesian model where the monetary authority induces an endogenous response of 
inflation. On impact, the destruction of the capital stock lowers both firm and equity 
values. This leads to an immediate spike in corporate defaults, and an increase in 
leverage ratios. Without a monetary response inflation remains constant (dashed 
lines), and the debt overhang leads to  long-lasting real declines in investment, con-
sumption, and output. It is particularly striking that despite the large destruction of 
capital, investment is below average for several periods after the shock.
In the New Keynesian model (dotted lines) however, monetary policy responds 
with a sustained increase in inflation which reduces the burden of outstanding lia-
bilities and default rates. This in turn mitigates the magnitude of the decline in the 
macroeconomic aggregates and the economy recovers a lot faster. With a  5 percent 
reduction in the capital stock, the model’s implied inflation rises about  1 percent 
above its steady-state level over the first year after the shock.
Table 5—Variance Decompositions (Due to Inflation)
Output Investment Consumption Hours Leverage Default
Panel A. Flexible price model
Benchmark 0.23 0.44 0.16 0.12 0.88 0.99
Shorter maturity,  λ = 0.06 0.22 0.42 0.14 0.10 0.86 0.99
One-period debt,  λ = 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.99
High leverage ( 0.52 ) 0.43 0.70 0.58 0.46 0.93 0.98
Low leverage ( 0.32 ) 0.10 0.22 0.04 0.03 0.64 0.99
Panel B. Sticky price model
Benchmark 0.38 0.73 0.06 0.90 0.92 0.99
Shorter maturity,  λ = 0.06 0.37 0.72 0.06 0.90 0.90 0.98
One-period debt,  λ = 1.00 0.24 0.47 0.02 0.87 0.94 1.00
High leverage ( 0.52 ) 0.44 0.82 0.13 0.92 0.94 0.99
Low leverage ( 0.32 ) 0.35 0.66 0.05 0.89 0.90 0.98
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Although only suggestive, this experiment is quite consistent with a policy pre-
scription in the immediate aftermath of the crisis and summarized by Rogoff (Miller 
2009):
I’m advocating 6 percent inflation for at least a couple of years. It would 
ameliorate the debt bomb and help us work through the deleveraging 
process.
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Figure 5. A Wealth Shock
Notes: This figure shows the effect of a  one-time exogenous destruction of the capital stock,  k , by 5 percent through 
an increase of the depreciation rate,  δ . It compares the model’s responses in the neoclassical model when inflation 
is unchanged (dashed line) and in the new Keynesian model when it adjusts endogenously according to the mone-
tary policy rule (dotted line).
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V. Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a general equilibrium model with nominal 
 long-term debt that can help us better understand the monetary  nonneutralities asso-
ciated with Irving Fisher’s (1933) debt deflation. The model also sheds some light 
on the slowdown following the 2008 financial crisis and possible monetary policy 
responses. Our model is capable of generating very large and persistent movements 
in output and investment, even without price rigidities. Adding standard price rigid-
ities helps the model producing more volatile labor and more realistic  comovements 
between investment and consumption.
Almost unavoidably, our attempt to write a parsimonious and tractable model 
leaves out many important features. In particular, we ignore nominal debt contracts 
other than those held by firms, even though household debt is roughly equal in mag-
nitude and subject to similarly large restructuring costs.
Our analysis also abstracts from the role of movements in credit risk premia and the 
behavior of asset prices in general. In addition, while convenient, the assumption of 
constant returns to scale, which nearly eliminates firm heterogeneity and renders the 
model so tractable, also limits our ability to study firm behavior more comprehensively.
We leave the explorations of these and other simplifying assumptions for future 
work. Nevertheless we believe none is essential to the main ideas in the paper.
Appendix: Solution Method
The dynamics of the model are characterized using a  first-order perturbation 
approximation around the deterministic steady state.
To compute the deterministic steady state,  R is initially taken as given. Three 
equations, (15), (16), and (17), are used to solve for the steady-state level of lever-
age by value function iteration. The  first-order condition for investment is then used 
to find an updated value for  R , and this is repeated until convergence.
The full model’s steady state is then obtained by combining the steady-state value 
for leverage with the equilibrium conditions (11)–(21), the  first-order conditions for 
consumption and labor supply implied by the household’s preferences (10), (22), 
and the derivatives of (22) and (21) with respect to  ω .
To study the model’s dynamics, this system of equations is augmented with one 
equation determining the behavior of the second derivative of the policy function, 
h ωω =  ( h ω / ω)  h 1 , which is based on the assumption that the first derivative of the 
policy function exhibits constant elasticity in  ω . The coefficient  h 1 is set equal to 
 h ωω (ω /  h ω ) evaluated at the deterministic steady state.
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